Abstract We consider Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium models involving separable concave cost functions. In contrast to the models with linear and convex cost functions, in these models a local equilibrium point may not be a global one. We propose algorithms for finding global and local equilibrium points for the models having separable concave cost functions. The proposed algorithms use the convex envelope of a separable concave cost function over boxes to approximate a concave cost model with an affine cost one. The latter is equivalent to a strongly convex quadratic program that can be solved efficiently. To obtain better approximate solutions the algorithms use an adaptive rectangular bisection which is performed only in the space of concave variables Computational results on a lot number of randomly generated data show that the proposed algorithm for global equilibrium point are efficient for the models with moderate number of concave cost functions while the algorithm for local equilibrium point can solve efficiently the models with much larger size.
We recall that a point (strategy) x * = (x
where β > 0, α > 0 and, for every i, the cost function h i is affine that depends only on the quantity x i of firm i. In this linear case, it has been shown that (see e.g. [9] ) the model has a unique Nash equilibrium point which is the unique solution of a strongly convex quadratic program. In the case h i is differentiable convex, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium point can be formulated as a monotone variational inequality [3, 11] which can be solved by available methods for the monotone variational inequality.
In some practical applications, the cost for production of a unit commodity decreases as the quantity of the production gets larger. The cost function then is concave rather than convex. Nash-Cournot oligopolistic models with concave cost functions are considered in recent paper by Bigi and Passacantando in [2] . For these models, as it is shown [14] that the problem can be formulated as a mixed variational inequality of the form
In this problem F is not monotone and ϕ may not be convex, and therefore the existing methods for the monotone variational inequality cannot be applied. In [14] an algorithm is proposed for finding a global equilibrium point of the model when some of the cost functions are piecewise linear concave. However the algorithm there is efficient only when the number of the piecewise linear concave cost functions is relatively small. In [17] a proximal point method was described for finding a stationary point of the model. However a stationary point may not be a global, even not a local equilibrium point. In this paper we continue our work in [14] and [17] by considering Nash-Cournot models, where some of the cost functions are separable concave, the remaining costs are affine. Namely we approximate the model with concave cost functions by piecewise linear concave cost models that can be solved by an existing Search-and-Check algorithm in [14] . Thanks to the fact that the strategy set is a rectangle (box) and the cost functions are separable increasing, the model has particular features that can be employed to develop efficient algorithms for solving it. We propose two algorithms: the first one is a search-checkbranch procedure that approximates the model with concave cost functions by the models with piecewise linear concave functions. Thanks to the affine property of the price function and separability of the concave cost function the latter models can be equivalently formulated as a strongly convex quadratic problem. In order to obtain better approximate solutions the algorithm use an adaptive rectangular bisection which is performed only in the space of the concave variables. The computational results on a lot number of randomly generated data show that this algorithm are efficient for models with a medium number (≤ 40) of the firms having concave cost functions, the number of total variables may be much larger. In order to solve the models with larger number of the firms having concave cost functions we use again the convex envelope of a concave function over a box to develop an algorithm for obtaining a local equilibrium point.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define a gap function that can serve as a stoping criterion for the algorithms. The third section is devoted to description of the algorithms and analysis of their convergence. We close the paper with some computational results and experiences.
A Gap Function as a Stoping Criterion
In this section, we define a gap function for Nash-Cournot models involving concave cost functions. This gap function will serve as a stoping criterion for checking whether a point is equilibrium or not. To be precise, we consider the Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market model presented above under the assumption that each profit function f j is defined by (1) where h j , j = 1, . . . , n with n ≤ N is increasing concave while h i with i > n is increasing affine. This assumption is motivated by the fact that for some firms the cost consists of both the production and transportation costs, while for the other ones, the production need not to transport. In practice the transportation cost function is concave (see the example in [2] ).
First, we define the bifunction φ by taking
where a := (α, α, . . . , α) T ,
and we suppose that
Then the problem of finding an equilibrium point for the model can be formulated as a mixed variational inequality problem MV(D) of the form (see e.g. [14] )
where ϕ(y) := y
Clearly, ϕ is a DC separable function if each h i is concave, in particular case, if each h i is affine, then ϕ is a separable strongly quadratic convex function. In the latter case every local equilibrium point is global one and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 [9, 14] Suppose that the cost function h is affine(classical model) given as h(x) := µ T x + ξ. Then variational inequality M V (D) can be equivalently formulated as the convex quadratic programming problem min{x
Gap functions are commonly used to determine stoping rules in optimization, variational inequality and equilibrium problems as well as to reformulate them as a mathematical programming problem. Following this idea, we now define a gap function for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium models with separable concave cost functions. Namely, for Problem MV(D) we define a gap function by taking, for each x ∈ D,
Lemma 2 Suppose that cost function h i is continuous on D i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then (i) The function g(x) is well defined, continuous and g(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ D;
(ii) A point x * ∈ D is equilibrium for the model if only if g(x * ) = 0.
Proof. This lemma can be derived from Theorem 2.1 in [7] . Here we give a direct proof for MV(D).
(i) Since D is compact and, for each x ∈ D, Φ(x, .) is continuous on D, Φ(x, .) attains its minimum on D. Further, from property Φ(x, x) = 0, it follows that g(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ D.
(ii) Suppose that x * ∈ D is an equilibrium point, then
which implies g(x * ) ≤ 0. Hence g(x * ) = 0. Conversely, if g(x * ) = 0, then from the definition of g(x * ) one has Φ(x * , y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ D, that means that x * is a equilibrium point of the model. Motivated by this lemma, we call a point x ǫ an ǫ-equilibrium point if g(x ǫ ) ≤ ǫ. We rewrite the bifunction Φ as
the gap function g then can be rewritten as
Since D is the box of the form
we can further write g(x) as
A simple arrangement using (5) yields
where (6) it follows that evaluating g(x), for each x ∈ D, one needs to solve N -optimal problems each of them is one-variable minimization problem of the form
In order to compare the Cournot model presented above with existing models let us consider the Bertrand model. In a Bertrand model the firms producing a common homogenous commodity. In contrast to the Cournot model, here each firm sets prices rather than the production quantity. So, in such a model, the demand is a function of price.and the customers buy from firms with lowest price. However, often this assumption is not realistic, since usually the products of the firms are not entirely interchangeable, and thus some consumers may prefer one product to the other even it costs somewhat more. Suppose that the quantity level x i produced by firm i depends on the price and given by
The condition σ i > 0 means that the demand for firm i decreases as its price increases, while λ ij ≥ 0. (i = j) means that the demand for firm i increases when other firms increase their price. The profit function of firm i then is given as
where, following [2] , we assume that the cost h i (.) is a concave function of the production level and is given by
Then an elementary computation shows that the cost is a function of the price as
The profit function then takes the form
Each firm i attempts to maximize its profit by choosing a corresponding price level on its strategy set [0, T i ] by solving the optimization problem
where p[y i ] is the vector obtained from p by replacing p i with y i .
By the same technique as in the Nash-Cournot model the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium point of this Bertrand model can be formulated as a mixed variational inequality of the form
, So as the Nash-cournot model, the Bertrand model can be formulated as a mixed variational inequality M V (D). Note that since σ i (d i σ i − 1), i = 1, . . . , n may be negative, the function ψ(.) may not convex.
An Algorithm for Global Equilibria
In this section we describe an algorithm for approximating a global equilibrium point of the model. The idea of the proposed algorithm is quite natural, it uses the convex envelope of the concave cost function to approximate the original model with the one having piecewise linear concave costs. The latter can be solved by an algorithm developed in [14] to obtain an approximate equilibrium point x. Then by evaluating the gap function we can check whether or not the obtained point x is an ǫ-equilibrium point. If not, we use an adaptive rectangular bisection to get a better approximate point. Thanks to the rectangular structure of the strategy set and separability of the cost function, the proposed algorithm can be implemented easily.
A Search-Check-Branch Algorithm
First we recall [8] that the convex envelope of a function ϕ on a convex set C is the convex function on C, denoted by co C ϕ such that co C ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(x) for every x ∈ C, and if ξ is any convex function on C satisfying ξ(x) ≤ ϕ(x) for every x ∈ C, then ξ(x) ≤ co C ϕ(x) for every x ∈ C. It is well known [8] that the convex envelope of a concave function is affine, and that if
where co ϕ j is the convex envelope of ϕ j over C j . Clearly, since h i , i > n is affine, h i ≡ coh i on every convex set.
The algorithm we are going to describe is a search-check-branch procedure. For a given tolerance ǫ ≥ 0, at each iteration, the algorithm consists of three steps. The search-step requires solving convex quadratic programs for the approximate model with piecewise linear concave cost functions to obtain an approximate equilibrium point. The check-step uses the gap function presented in the preceding section to check whether the obtained solution is an ǫ-equilibrium point or not yet. The branch-step employs an adaptive rectangular bisection performed in the space of concave variables to obtain a better approximation for the model.
To be precise, suppose that the strategy set
For a n-dimensional subbox I ⊆ I 0 , define
and consider the convex mixed variational inequality CMV(D I ) defined as
In what follows we write x DI = (x I , x J ) with x I ∈ I, x J ∈ J 0 . Since co I h(.) is affine, by Lemma 1, this problem is reduced to the strongly convex quadratic program min
where
Suppose that each strategy set D j ( j = 1, . . . , n) has been divided into interval D j,1 , . . . , D j,kj on each of them the cost function is affine. Let ∆ be the set of n-dimensional subboxes defined as ∆ := {B := I 1 × · · · × I n : I j ∈ {D j,1 , . . . , D j,kj }, j = 1, . . . , n}.
Define Σ as the family of N -dimensional subboxes by taking
Let us define the gap function for the model with piecewise concave cost function, that is
whereφ (x, y) :
whereh is the piecewise linear concave function obtained by taking the convex envelope of h on each element of Σ. Note that, since h i is affine on D i for every i = n + 1, . . . , N , the convex envelope of h i on any subbox coincides with h i for every i = n + 1, . . . , N . In particular, co D h is affine and
First we briefly describe the algorithm in [14] as follows. Algorithm 1 (Search-and-Check). Choose a tolerance ǫ ≥ 0.
Step 1: Select a subbox I ∈ Σ.
Step 2: Solve the strongly convex quadratic problem (QD I ) to obtain its unique solution x DI .
Step 3: a) Ifḡ(x DI ) ≤ ǫ, terminate: x DI is an ǫ-equilibrium point for piecewise concave cost model. It is obvious that in the worst case, the algorithm searches all subboxes in Σ, however the computational results reported in [14] show that by using the gap function, in general, the algorithm finds an ǫ-equilibrium point without searching all elements of Σ.
Using Algorithm 1 described above we can develop an algorithm for approximating an equilibrium point of the model where some of the cost functions are concave. The idea is quite natural. In fact, at each iteration we use the convex envelope of the concave cost function to obtain a model with piecewise lineae concave cost function to which we can apply the search-and-check Algorithm 1 to obtain an approximate equilibrium point. If the obtained point is not yet an ǫ-equilibrium point, we use an adaptive rectangular bisection (Rule 1 below) to reduce the difference between the concave function and its convex envelope to obtain a better approximate equilibrium point for the original model, and so on. An adaptive rectangular bisection (Rule 1). Let I be a given n-dimensional subbox of
Then we bisect I into two boxes via the middle point of edge I jmax . We call this middle point the bisection point and j max the bisection index. For this bisection we have the following lemma whose proof can be found, e.g., in [12, 13] .
Lemma 3 Let {I k } be an infinite sequence of boxes generated by the adaptive rectangular bisection Rule 1 such that I k+1 ⊂ I k for every k. Let b k be the bisection point and j k be the bisection index for
Consequently, {I j k } tends to a singleton. provided h j k is (concave) not affine on I j k for every j k .
For each subbox I having n-edges I j (j = 1, . . . , n) we define ρ(I j ) := max t∈Ij {h j (t) − coh j (t)} and ρ(I) := max{ρ(I j ) :  = 1, . . . , n}.
The algorithm now can be described as follows: Algorithm 2 (Search-Check-Branch for global equilibria). Initial step. Choose a tolerance ǫ ≥ 0, take the initial box
which is equivalent to the strongly convex quadratic program (QD I 0 ) to obtain its unique solution u 0 .
At the beginning of each iteration k we have:
, the equilibrium point of the model with piecewise linear concave function;
• x k ∈ D: the currently best feasible point, i.e., g(x k ) is smallest among the obtained feasible points so far.
Step 2. Use the bisection Rule 1 described above to bisect I k into two boxes I k + and I k − . Let j k be the bisection index for I k .
Step 3. Solve the strongly convex quadratic program (QD I ) with I = I k − and I = I k + to obtain x k+ and x k− respectively. Step 4. If either g(x k+ ) ≤ ǫ or g(x k− ) ≤ ǫ, terminate. Otherwise, update x k , Σ k and the linear piecewise concave cost function by taking respectively
Step 5. Compute the convex envelope of function h j k on the egde j k of the subboxes I k − , I k + , thereby to obtain the new approximation bifunction
where co k+1 h is the convex envelope of h obtained by replacing the convex envelope of h j k on the edge j k of I k by the convex envelope of h j k on the edge j k of I k − and I k + . Then use Algorithm 1 with the just obtained piecewise linear concave cost function to solve the newly approximated piecewise linear concave model to obtain u k+1 . Increase k by one and go to Step 1 of iteration k. Suppose that every model with piecewise linear concave cost function has an ǫ-equilibrium point for any ǫ > 0. Then we have the following convergence result. Convergence Theorem.
(i) If the algorithm terminates at iteration k then x k is an ǫ-equilibrium point.
(ii) If the algorithm does not terminate, it generates an infinite sequence {x k } such that any its cluster point is an equilibrium point whenever the model has an equilibrium point. Furthermore g(x k ) ց 0 as k → ∞. Proof. The statement (i) is obvious. To prove statement (ii) we suppose that the algorithm never terminates. Let x * be any cluster point of {x k }. Then there exists a subsequence of {x kq } that tends to x * . Thus the corresponding sequence of selected intervals has a nested sequence, which, by taking a subsequence if necessary, we denote also by I kq . Since I kq is the box to be bisected at iteration k q , by Lemma 3, {I kq } tends to a singleton, which implies that h jq (x jq ) − co h jq (x jq ) → 0 as q → ∞ (j q is the bisection index at iteration k q ). By the rule for selecting the bisection index, we have h j (x j ) − co h j (x j ) → 0 for every j. Since u kq is an equilibrium point of the model with piecewise linear concave cost function, we haveḡ kq (u kq ) = 0 for every q, wherē g kq is the gap function for the piecewise linear concave cost model at iteration k q . By the definition of the gap function g for the original model and ofḡ for the approximate model, and the rule for selecting bisection index, we can writeḡ
Letting q → ∞, since σ kq → 0, u kq → u * , by continuity of g, we obtain g(u * ) = 0. On the other hand, since x kq is the currently best feasible point obtained at iteration k q , we have 0 ≤ g(x kq ) ≤ g(u kq ). Letting q → ∞, by continuity of g, we obtain 0 ≤ g(x * ) = g(u * ) = 0, which means that x * is an equilibrium of the model. Note that, since x k is the currently best feasible point obtained at iteration k, by definition, the sequence {g(x k )} is nonincreasing. Since the whole sequence {x k } is bounded, it has a subsequence {x kj } converging to somex. Then, as we just have shown,x is an equilibrium point which implies g(x) = 0. Then the whole sequence {g(x k )} tends to 0 as well.
Remark 1
In order to save the memory, we may use a criterion to delete every subbox that does not contain an equilibrium point in it.
The following lemma gives a criterion that can be used to check whether a subbox contains an equilibrium point or not. In fact, for a subbox
Then we have the following lemma: 
Proof.
(i) Since x DI is the solution of (QD I ), we have
Note that h(y) ≥ co I h(y), ∀y ∈ D I , by the assumption, co I h(x DI ) = h(x DI ), we obtain
for every y ∈ D I , which means that x DI is the equilibrium point the model restricted on D I . (ii) We now prove that g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ D I . Indeed, by definition
Since y ≥ 0,B 1 and B 1 are non-negative matrices, h i (.)(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) are increasing functions and l I ≤ x ≤ u I for every x ∈ D I , we can write, for every y ∈ D and x ∈ D I ,
By the definition ofg(D I ), it follows from (12) that
which implies that D I does not contain an equilibrium point.
An Algorithm for Local Equilibria
Using the fact that a point x * ∈ D is an equilibrium point of the model if and only if the gap function g(x * ) = 0, we say that a pointx is a local equilibrium point of the model if there exists an open set B ⊂ D such thatx ∈ B, g B (x) = 0, where g B stands for the gap function of the model restricted on B. Note that because of concavity of the cost function, in this equilibrium Nash-Cournot model, a local equilibrium point may not be a global one.
In this section, we propose an algorithm for approximating a local equilibrium point of the model by using again the gap function. Namely, for a subbox
let, as before, D I be the subbox of D consists of all points
Then define the gap function g DI restricted on D I by taking
where σ (−i) (x) := N j =i x j . As before we use the convex envelope of the concave function h on each subbox D I to obtain a convex mixed variational inequality whose solution can be obtained by solving a strongly convex quadratic over D I . If it happens that at the obtained solution the values of the cost function and its convex envelope on D I coincide, this solution is a local equilibrium point of the model. Otherwise we bisect I to reduce the difference between the cost function and its convex envelope on D I . Note that if g DI (x) = 0 for some x ∈ D I , then x is a local equilibrium point. Thus, if x ∈ D I and g I (x) ≤ ǫ, then x is an ǫ-local equilibrium point. Since x DI is the equilibrium point of the model with respect to D I , from the definitions of the convex envelope of h and the gap function restricted on D I , it follows that h(x DI ) − co I h(x DI ) = 0 implies g DI (x DI ) = 0. The algorithm now can be described as follows. Algorithm 3 (Search-Check-Branch for local equilibria). Initial step. Choose tolerances ǫ > 0 and solve Problem (QD) to obtain its optimal solution x • Γ k : a finite family of n-dimensional subboxes of I 0 ;
• ǫ k = min{g DI (x DI ) : I ∈ Γ k }, where x DI is the optimal solution of the convex quadratic program (QD I );
Step 1. (Stoping criteria) If ǫ k ≤ ǫ, terminate: x DI with ǫ k = g DI (x DI ) is an ǫ-local equilibrium point.
Step 2. (Selection) Choose I k ∈ Γ k such that
Step 3. (Bisection): Divide the subbox I k into two subboxes I k + and I k − by the bisection Rule 1.
Step 4. Solve the strongly convex quadratic programs (QD I ) with I := I Step 5. Let ǫ k+1 := argmin{ǫ k , g DI (x DI ) with I = I k − and I = I k + }.
Step 6. (Updating) If g(x DI ) > 0 delete I from further consideration. Let Γ k+1 be the remaining set. If Γ k+1 = ∅, terminate: the model has no ǫ-local equilibrium point. Otherwise, go to iteration k with k := k + 1. Convergence. The algorithm terminates after a finite iteration yielding an ǫ-local equilibrium point whenever it does exist.
The proof of this convergence result is evident because of the fact that ǫ > 0, that the sequence of selected boxes tends to a singleton and that the gap function is continuous.
Remark 2
If for every i, the cost function h i satisfies the condition
Then the model admits a solution. Indeed, for each x ∈ D, let H i (x) be the solution set of the problem
It is easy to check that condition (14) ensures that the object function of this problem is convex in y i . Thus H i (x) is a closed convex of the interval D i . Since the objective function of this problem is continuous and the feasible is compact, the solution set H i (x) is a upper semicontinuous mapping from D into itself, by well-known Kakutani fixed point, the mapping H(x) := H 1 (x) × . . . × H N (x) has a fixed point x * , which is also an equilibrium point of the model.
Note that both the cost functions
. . , n. used in [2] and
with γ i > 0 and γ 2 i ≤ 2β i , ∀i = 1, . . . , n satisfy condition (14).
Computational Results and Experiments
The proposed two algorithms were implemented in MATLAB. The programs were executed on a PC Core 2Duo 2*2.0 GHz, RAM 2GB. We tested the program on different groups of problems, each of them contains ten problems of different sizes N and n, but having randomly generated input data. Namely, for each problem, the numbers α, β, µ i (i = n + 1, . . . , N ) are randomly generated in the interval [20.30], [0.001, 0.005] and [10.20] respectively. We take the cost functions of the form
where γ j and a j are randomly generated in [7, 15] and [2, 7] respectively. The strategy set of firm i is
where each u i is randomly generated in the interval [100.500].
The obtained results are reported in Table 4 .1 below, where we use the following headings:
-N : number of the firms; -n: number of the firms having concave (but not affine) cost; -Average time: the average time (in second) needed to solve one problem; -Average iter: the average numbers of iterations for one problem.
-Glob-GSCB: number of problems for which an equilibrium point was obtained by Search-Check-Branch Algorithm for global equilibria. -Glob-LCB: number of problems for which a global optimal solution was obtained by Search-CheckBranch for local equilibria. Table 4 .1 we can conclude the followings for the tested concave cost functions given as (15) .
• Algorithm 2 for global equilibrium point can solve models with a moderate number (n ≤ 40) of concave cost functions, while Algorithm 3 can solve models where the number of concave cost functions much larger.
• For models where the number of the firms having concave cost is somewhat large (n ≥ 40), the local equilibrium point obtained by the local algorithm is often not a global one.
Conclusion
A Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium model involving concave cost functions may have local equilibrium points that are not global ones. We have approximated such a model with the one having piecewise linear concave function by using the convex envelope of a separable concave function over a box. Based upon this approximation we have proposed two algorithms for approximating a global as well as local equilibrium points that employ a gap function as a stoping criterion for the algorithms, and an update rectangular bisection to make the approximation better. Some computational results have been reported showing efficiency of the proposed algorithms for models where the number of the concave (but not affine) cost functions is not large (n ≤ 40) for global algorithm, and (n ≤ 200) for local one. An open question that would be interesting for further consideration is to find a differentiable gap function, for which a local optimization algorithms such as descent ones in [6] or DCA in [16] could be applied efficiently.
